In this paper we exploit a substantial reform of the Dutch UI law to study the effect of the entitlement period to benefits on shortening unemployment duration and subsequent labor market outcomes. We find that shortening the entitlement period increases the job finding rate. However, decreases the job quality. Unemployed workers accept lower wages and fewer working hours. Furthermore, they change jobs and accept temporary jobs more often. This is a preliminary version, please do not quote!
Introduction
In most continental European Countries the welfare state has been expanding until the early 1990s. Since then the generosity of benefit schemes has gradually been reduced. But compared to other OECD countries, continental European countries still provide relatively generous benefits 1 . The Netherlands is no exception. Until 2006, the maximum entitlement period to UI benefits could be up to 5 years and most workers would receive 70% of their last wage during this period. Providing benefits for inactivity causes moral hazard problems. Unemployed workers may exert too little effort to find work or become too selective in which job offer to accept. Being selective is not always bad. For example, unemployment benefits act as a search subsidy, i.e. individuals can financially survive without work and are not forced to immediately start working in the first available job, which might be ill-suited for them. In a system with generous benefits, the quality of the match between worker and job may, therefore, be better.
In this paper we study the effect of the length of entitlement to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on the exit rate from unemployment and subsequent labor market outcomes. In the empirical analysis we exploit a substantial reform in the Dutch UI law in October 2006. Both before and after the reform the maximum entitlement period depended on age and working history. Due to the reform the shortest entitlement period was reduced from 6 to 3 months, and the longest entitlement period from 60 to 38 months. However, for some workers the entitlement period did not change or even slightly increased. This allows us to separate calendar time effects from the effects of the changed UI benefit entitlement.
Job search theory predicts that the duration of unemployment increases when the benefits entitlement period is extended. Empirical evidence confirms this. For example van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) conduct a natural experiment by exploiting changes in Slovenia's unemployment insurance system. They find spikes in job finding at the points where benefits were exhausted. In addition, the shortening of the benefit period has a significant positive effect on the probability of finding a job. They also find that the exit rate to work and other destinations is higher for workers whose benefit period was shortened. Lalive (2008) considers a program in Austria which extended the maximum entitlement of benefits from 30 to 209 weeks. He finds that if the entitlement period for UI benefits is extended, the exit rate to work gets lower. Card and Levine (2000) conclude that the effect of the extended benefits program is mixed. The state level comparison in their study shows that exit rates from unemployment during the regular benefit period remain largely unaffected, but the individual level data on benefits receipt show a significant reduction in exit rates during the extended benefit period. These results indicate that in the long-run an extension of UI benefits with 13 weeks (from a baseline of 26 weeks) increases the average unemployment spell with about one week.
Furthermore Moffitt (1985) , Katz and Meyer (1990) and Meyer (1990) show that exit rates from unemployment rise sharply just before the end of benefit entitlement. This suggests that unemployed workers search harder and become less selective when their benefits are due to expire. This provides strongly suggestive evidence that the availability of longer unemployment benefits provides incentives to remain unemployed for a longer period. However, focusing on such spikes in exit rates from unemployment just before benefits exhaustion does not answer the policy relevant question how the duration of benefit entitlement affects exit rates from unemployment. Answering this question requires exogenous variation in the benefit entitlement period. The studies mentioned above use variation over time and across states, but this may suffer from endogenous policy formation since states may, for example, decide to extend the benefit entitlement period during recessions.
However the reduced exit rate due to longer benefit entitlement is not necessarily bad. If in the presence of generous benefits individuals are more selective on which jobs to accept, the overall quality of worker-job matches may increase and this can have a positive effect on productivity. Empirical studies do not find any evidence for improved worker-job matches due to extending the entitlement period. Lalive (2007) does not find an effect on post-unemployment wages. A similar result is found by Card et al. (2007) . Centeno and Novo (2009) and Cockx and Picchio (2009) do find a small positive effect of extension of UI benefits on post-unemployment wages. And also Schmieder et al. (2012b) do not find effects on job quality, measured as the wage of the job after unemployment in the short and the long run (five years after unemployment). Tatsiramos (2009) finds that an increase of the entitlement period has an increasing effect on the re-employment hazard.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, job search theory predicts that the exit rate will increase as the end of the entitlement period approaches. This is confirmed by most of the literature, however the exit rate seems to decline after the moment of exhaustion, causing a spike. This is contradictory to what job search theory predicts. Our dataset allows us to study the exit rate around the time of exhaustion for unemployed workers who do not face a large income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits. This can give further insight to why these spikes occur. To our knowledge this has not been studies before. Second, since the reform either decreased, increased or had no effect on the maximum duration of unemployment benefits and this change was based on both age and employment history, we can measure the effect for the entire unemployed population, while most earlier studies focussed on specific subgroups. Third, there is a lot of variation in the size of change, varying from an increase of 2 months to a decrease of 22 months, which allows us to study both small and large effects to see if the effect is linear over the number of months. Fourth, our data allow to control for many observable variables like age, sector, household and income of partner. This extensive database also enables us to study the effects on post-unemployment job quality, like wage and contract hours, and long-term effects. Fifth, the large number of records means that we can get precise estimates of the effect of changes in maximum duration on length of unemployment and labor market outcomes in the Netherlands.
In the empirical analysis, we use administrative data on all UI benefits spells that started between July 2004 and December 2008. This includes in total over 800,000 spells. We combine different datasets provided by Statistics Netherlands to observe demographic and socioeconomic information. We observe several labor outcomes, namely wage, number of working hours, type of contract and number of jobs. To study the effect of the entitlement period we use a difference in difference model as our empirical model. We use a Cox Proportional Hazard Model to estimate the effects of different time periods until exhaustion of the UI benefits. To estimate post-unemployment effects we again use a difference in difference model regressing earnings, working hours and number of jobs after unemployment.
We find empirical evidence that a decrease in the entitlement period increases the probability of exit to work within different time periods. Our results support job search theories that the job search intensity increases when the duration until exhaustion of the UI benefits shortens. On the other hand we find a reduction in earnings and working hours because of a decrease in entitlement period. This suggests that unemployed workers lower their reservation wages and job demands when faced with a reduction of the UI entitlement period. In contrast to the job search model we find effects of the entitlement period on unemployment duration and earnings for individuals who do not face an income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits. This would indicate that not only the height of the benefits, if any, matters, but also other aspects of the UI scheme, like the executer or the obligations of unemployed workers. It could also mean that facing a deadline increases outflow to jobs, even though the consequences of this deadline are small. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide theoretical background. In section 3 we describe the Dutch UI system and the reform of October 2006. In section 4 we present our data, in section 5 we discuss the results of the analysis of the effects on duration and in section 6 the results of the analysis of subsequent job quality. In section 8 we provide an explanation of our findings. We present our conclusions in section 9.
Theory
Dynamic job search models (Mortensen (1977) , van den Berg (1990) ) describe the job search behaviour of unemployed workers. It is generally assumed that an unemployed worker maximizes his or her utility over a period in the future , where utility is a function of income and leisure time. The unemployed worker chooses an optimal level of search intensity and when receiving a job offer decides whether or not to accept the offer. Individuals use a reservation wage strategy, which implies that unemployed workers will accept a job offer only if the wage is above the reservation wage. Individuals choose their job search effort such that the marginal costs of effort equal to marginal returns.
The generosity of unemployment benefits plays an important role. Theory suggests that if benefits are generous, either in duration or in height of the benefits, then unemployed workers will become more selective in which job offers to accept. An increase in the level or length of UI benefits increases the reservation wage, since it increases the utility from unemployment. Moreover generous benefits reduce the returns to job search effort, implying that unemployed workers will reduce their effort. Both effects cause that the expected duration of an unemployment spell is predicted to increase in the generosity of unemployment benefits. The behavioural responses to providing generous unemployment benefits are referred to as moral hazard.
The nonstationary job search models imply that the utility of unemployment decreases with unemployment duration since the remaining period of receiving UI benefits decreases, and therefore the reservation wage of unemployed individuals decreases and search intensity increases with UI duration, leading to an increasing exit rate to employment with UI duration. The exit rate to employment is highest at the moment of exhaustion of UI benefits and stays high thereafter. Figure 1 illustrates the exit rate for different scenarios. We see that the exit rate increases over time up to time T when the UI benefits are exhausted because of the decreasing reservation wage and increasing search intensity. An exception is the flat exit rate for the scenario in which an individual receives social assistance benefits after time T which are equal to UI benefits. In this scenario the utility function and therefore the search intensity and reservation wage are constant over time, since the unemployed worker does not face an income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits. In the case of lower social assistance benefits than UI benefits, the exit rate after exhaustion of UI benefits will be lower than without entitlement to SA benefits, since the replacement rate after exhaustion will be higher. When UI benefits would be increased, we would observe a lower exit rate at the start of unemployment, since the replacement rate would be higher. After exhaustion of UI benefits however, the exit rate would be higher than in the scenario with low UI benefits, since finding a job would yield a higher utility because the potential UI benefits have increased. Figure 1 clearly illustrates the important role of both UI benefits and SA benefits in the model. The model suggests that if UI benefits are generous, either in duration or in height of the benefits, then the exit rate will decrease because finding a job yields a lower utility. The unemployed worker will become more selective in accepting jobs and will search less intense. A higher generosity of SA benefits, either in height or in entitlement requirements, would also lower the exit rate of unemployed workers. figure 1 , however most of them find that the exit rate drops after exhaustion of UI benefits, causing so-called spikes. Standard nonstationary job search models do not explain the existence of these spikes in job acceptance rates around the moment of exhaustion of UI benefits. Several explanations for the existence of spikes have been given. In the static job search model of Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) and Meyer (1990) an unemployed worker can find a job with a fixed wage at any given time and chooses the unemployment duration and moment of employment. Since the budget constraint is kinked at the moment of exhaustion because UI benefits are stopped, individuals accept a job just before exhaustion of UI benefits. Boone and van Ours (2012) describe a job search model where employers and unemployed workers decide to delay the starting date of a new job to a moment around the time of exhaustion of UI benefits, causing spikes in the exit rate. Another explanation is given by Decreuse and Kazbakova (2008) who suggest that employers receive a negative signal when an unemployed worker remains unemployed after exhaustion of UI benefits indicating that the worker is not skilled. This causes the decrease in the exit rate to employment after exhaustion, even though the unemployed workers have a high search intensity and low reservation wage. Katz and Meyer (1990) find that a large part of the spike is caused by employers who re-employ layoffed workers at the moment of UI exhaustion. The nonstationary job search model of Mortensen (1977) can also explain the spike if we make the assumption that income and leisure are substitutes. This means that at the moment of UI benefit exhaustion income is substituted by leisure time.
In this paper we will study if the spikes also exist for individuals who do not face a large income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits, to give further insights to why spikes occur.
Institutional setting
The Dutch Unemployment Insurance (UI) law insures all employees against the risk of unemployment.
2 If a worker becomes unemployed, she is entitled to UI benefits, provided that she has a sufficiently long employment history. Entitlement required that the worker lost at least 50% of her working hours with a minimum of 5 working hours. Before October 2006, entitlement also required that the worker had worked at least 26 of the previous 39 weeks and at least 52 days in four out of the five previous years. The maximum duration of collecting benefits depended on the worker's employment history. A calendar year counts as employed if the worker worked at least 52 days in this year. Because the UI administration does not have a record of employment histories before 1998, the number of employed years before 1998 is equal to the age of the worker on January 1 1998 minus 18. If the worker had been employed for four years, the entitlement period was six months. If the worker had worked between five and ten years, the maximum length was nine months. And this maximum entitlement period increased with each interval of five additional years of employment. The maximum duration of benefits was 60 months for individuals who had worked at least 40 years. The benefits were 70% of the last earned wage (copped at a maximum). Due to a reform in October 2006 the UI eligibility conditions changed. A worker is entitled to UI benefits if she has worked at least 26 weeks out of the previous 36 weeks. All workers satisfying this requirement receive at least three months of benefits. During the first two months they receive 75% of the last earned wage and 70% after the first two months. If the worker has worked at least four of the previous five years, the worker receives benefits for one additional month for each employed year. The maximum length of benefits is reduced from 60 to 38 months (from 38 years of employment history). Figure 2 shows the maximum entitlement to UI benefits before and after October 2006. The impact of the reform varies with the employment history, but it is most substantial for individuals with a long employment history. Someone with an employment history of at least 40 years had an entitlement period of 60 months before the reform, while after the reform this was reduced to 38 months. For individuals with an employment history of nine, 18 and 24 years the entitlement period was not changed by the reform, while for individuals with an employment history of 13, 14 or 19 years the entitlement period after the reform was longer than before the reform.
If an unemployed worker does not have substantial employment history or has exceeded his maximum UI period, she can apply for social assistance. Social assistance is means tested, the household income should be below a certain threshold and the household cannot have substantial savings. The benefits are equal to 50% of the minimum wage. Couples and single-parents receive additional benefits. The UI and social assistance scheme are different in several ways. First, UI is executed by the national social insurance institute, while social assistance is executed by the municipalities. Municipalities have some freedom in implementing the social assistance law. The conditions on collecting benefits also differ. Second, during UI the unemployed worker has the obligation to apply for a job at least once a week and has to accept suitable jobs.
3 An unemployed worker collecting social assistance benefits has to accept all possible jobs, but municipalities have some discretion. Finally in general social assistance is associated with a larger stigma since UI is a workers insurance for which employers pay a premium, while social assistance is support for individuals who cannot provide in their own income. For each worker we observe at the moment of entering UI the age and exact employment history since 1999.
4 This allows us to construct for each individual the maximum entitlement period both before and after October 2006. So, we can also exactly determine the change in UI entitlement due to the reform. Recall that the size of the benefits also changed after October 2006, the first two months of unemployment an individual receives 75% of his last wage instead of 70%. This could also have an effect on the exit rate to work. We show in the appendix that we do not observe a significant effect on the exit rate to work of the increased benefits. 
Description of the data
We use data provided by Statistics Netherlands covering the period from 1999 to 2010. Statistics Netherlands combines information from different administrations using social security numbers. We use data from registrations at municipalities and the UI administration. The latter includes all payments of benefits, but also information on jobs such as wage, working hours, type of contract (temporary or permanent), sector, etc. Our data cover the total Dutch population. The data contain 1,538,776 individuals who started collecting UI benefits at least once between 1999 and 2010 and they experienced over 2.3 million spells. Figure  3 shows for each quarter the number of individuals entering UI. The upper left graph shows that the inflow follows the business cycle closely and that there is no substantial change in the inflow around the moment of the reform. The figure shows that from the end of 2008 onwards the inflow into UI increased substantially. Therefore, in the empirical analysis we only consider individuals entering UI between July 1, 2004 and December 31, 2008 . This provides an interval of 27 months both before and after the reform. Our results are not sensitive with respect to this sample selection. Next, we distinguish different age groups. The inflow of younger workers fluctuates over the business cycle more strongly than of older workers. However, for workers older than 45 years the inflow increases substantially from the beginning of 2009. This coincided with the introduction of part-time UI for firms who faced a substantial drop in their turnover due to the financial crisis (e.g. Groot et al. (2012) ). Recall that we only consider inflow into UI until December 31, 2008, so before the introduction of part-time UI. The introduction of part-time UI should not affect our results. For each spell we observe daily information about the start and end of collecting benefits, and the level of benefits. We can construct the maximum entitlement period before and after October 2006 using the institutional rules (see section 3). We thereby correct for re-entering unemployment using the institutional rules, if a person re-enters unemployment in a period of 6 months, the maximum length is equal to the maximum length of the previous unemployment period corrected for the length of the previous unemployment period.
Once an individual stops collecting unemployment insurance benefits, we know if this was due to reaching the end of the entitlement period. In that case we observe if the individual starts collecting social assistance benefits. Otherwise we can observe the subsequent labor market status. We observe the number of days until an individual finds a job, and the wage, working hours and type of contract of this job. We also observe the number of jobs after the individual accepts her first job.
From the registration of municipalities we obtain demographic variables, which we merge with the labor market information. The demographic variables contain, for example, date of birth, gender, household composition, etc. This allows us to identify the partner for which we merge labor market outcomes. Recall that the partners' earnings determine whether someone will become eligible for collecting social assistance benefits after UI (see Section 3). From this information we can construct a variable that indicates if the individual will become eligible for social assistance benefits. We do not have access to information on saving and other assents, but for low-income workers without a working partner these are often below the social assistance threshold. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. We distinguish between UI spells that have started before and after the reform. In our sample around 46 percent are women and the average age is about 36 years of age. About 67 percent has a partner and 34 percent has a partner with an income such that after unemployment insurance the individual will not be entitled to welfare benefits. Around 36 percent of the individuals have children and about 19 percent are immigrants.
Both before and after the reform individuals had an employment history of, on average, around 14 years. If the institutional rules of before the reform would apply the average maximum entitlement period to UI benefits would be 16.9 months for individuals who entered unemployment before the reform and 17.0 years for those who entered after the reform. However, the reform reduced the average maximum entitlement period with almost nine months. Finally, the table shows in which sector individuals were employed prior to entering unemployment insurance. Figure 4 shows Kaplan-Meier estimates for the survival function to work. We distinguish between four groups that (would) have a different benefit entitlement period prior to the reform. We observe the largest outflow to work for individuals with an entitlement period of 6 months, after 6 months almost half of the unemployed workers have found a job, while for workers with an entitlement of 12 and 24 months this is 38% and 36% respectively. As expected the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival functions shift downwards after the reform since the maximum entitlement period was shortened for most individuals. For the population with a maximum benefit entitlement period prior to the reform of 6 months we observe a lower survival probability for the group that started after October 2006 up until approximately 450 days. After about 500 days the survival probability is lower for the group that started before October 2006. Since the group that entered unemployment after October 2006 generally has a smaller period of benefits this indicates that lowering the entitlement period from six months increases the probability of finding a job in roughly the first one and a half year but decreases this probability from one and a half year and onwards. The latter effect could also be due to the deduction in services by the unemployment agency that also occurred in October 2006.
The moment of intersection shifts further to the right as the maximum entitlement period before the reform increases. For the group with a maximum entitlement Number of spells period of two years, the survival probabilities of the two groups are equal at about three years. For the group with the maximum entitlement period of five years, this is the longest possible entitlement period, the survival probability of the group that entered after the reform is lower for the entire observed period of three years. The figures indicate that potential effects of the reduction of the entitlement period on outflow to work only exist during the original entitlement period and shortly after that period. The observed differences between the periods before and after the reform are not necessarily the effect of the reform but could also be caused by other factors like the business cycle. In the next section we will use econometric models to estimate the effects of the reduction of the entitlement period. 
Effects on unemployment duration
Economic theory (Section 2) predicts that a reduction in the entitlement period to UI benefits reduces the length of an unemployment spell. Therefore, unemployed workers are more likely to find work within a certain time period. We test this hypothesis by estimating a linear probability model for finding work within a certain time period in the next paragraph. Next, we estimate a hazard rate model to obtain more insight in how UI entitlement changes the re-employment hazard.
5.1
The effects of the entitlement period on the probability of finding a job
We consider a linear probability model for finding work within a fixed time period τ after entering unemployment
The outcome variable W takes value one if individual i who entered unemployment at calendar time t found work with τ units of time. The variable D describes the change (in months) in maximum entitlement period due to the reform. So prior to October 2006, the variable D always equals 0. And after the reform, the variable D describes the difference between the actual entitlement period and how long this period would be for individual i if the unemployment spell would have started prior to the reform. We construct D such that if the reform reduced the entitlement period with six months, D takes value six. Therefore, the parameter of interest δ τ should be interpreted as the increase in exit probability due to reducing the entitlement period with one month.
Recall that the maximum entitlement period to UI benefits is determined by the employment history. We included fixed effect γ for all possible values of the relevant employment history H. Including these fixed effects control for the endogeneity of D. Furthermore we include additional covariates X which include, for example, gender, age, household composition, immigrant status and sector. Finally, the time trend µ is specified using dummy variables for each quarter. This controls for calendar time variation in job finding probabilities, for example, due to business cycle variation.
Our empirical model is a difference-in-difference model. Recall from Section 3 that for some employment histories the reform did not affect the maximum entitlement period to UI benefits. This is the control group which identifies the time trend µ . The fixed effects for the employment histories control for differences in exit rates between individuals with different employment histories. So the identification of the effect of a change in the maximum entitlement period D hinges on a common trend between individuals with different employment histories.
We perform separate regressions for different values of τ . The baseline results are presented in Table 2 . Before October 2006, 22% of the unemployed workers found work within 3 months. After October 2006, this has increased to 30%. For 6, 12 and 18 months this has increased from 38% to 48%, 54% to 61% and 64% to 69% respectively. The estimates from the linear probability models confirm that this increase is due to the reduction of the maximum entitlement period, we find positive significant effects on exit to work for all values of τ . The effects are largest for exit to work within 12 months. A decrease of the maximum entitlement period of 12 months increases the probability of exit to work within twelve months with nearly 3%.
In Table 3 we present the results from the estimations for different subgroups. These are the results of the estimations of the coefficient of the variable reduction of the entitlement period in months. We observe similar coefficients for males, except for a higher effect of the reduction on finding work within 18 months. Our model suggest that individuals with a partner with wage, who are not entitled to social assistance benefits after the end of their entitlement to UI benefits, would have a higher search rate, since their income drop is larger after the end of the entitlement period. However, we do not find higher estimated effects for this group. The effects of a reduction on the exit rate of people with a low income are somewhat larger than for the total population. We would not expect to observe a significant effect for individuals who are entitled to social assistance benefits equal to UI benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits, since they do not face a large income drop. Though the effects are smaller for this group, they are still significant and therefore in contract to our job search model. The effects are smaller for finding work within 12 and 18 months. The longer the original entitlement period, the smaller the effects of a reduction of the entitlement period on finding work.
Modelling the duration of UI
The Kaplan-Meier estimates in Figure 4 show that the outflow from UI to work is not constant over time. The figures are in line with the job search model developed in 2, the outflow seems to depend on the time until exhaustion of UI benefits. This relationship between entitlement period and outflow to work could also be caused by differences between the distinguished subgroups, for example if unemployed workers with an entitlement period of 6 months have better job opportunities than workers with an entitlement period of 60 months or if seasonal effects exist.
To account for these differences we estimate the effects of the reduction of the entitlement period on duration until work using a Proportional Hazard Model with a spline function that allows us distinguish several periods before exhaustion of the UI benefits. The model has the form: 
where λ(t) denotes the baseline hazard rate describing duration dependence in job finding. Our function of interest is φ(max(U I) − t) which is a function of the remaining entitlement period after t days of unemployment. With this function we distinguish the time intervals of the last month of benefits, 1-3 months, 3-6, 6-12, 12-24, more than 24 months until exhaustion and the period after exhaustion. Calender time effect are modelled using the function Ψ(α+t) where α is the moment of inflow. We specify this using dummies for each quarter. We include the entitlement period, max(U I), and additional covariates X in ϕ(X, max(U I)) to control for possible endogeneity of the time until exhaustion.
Our empirical model is a difference-in-difference model, identification is similar to the LPM difference-in-difference model in the previous subsection. Recall from Section 3 that for some individuals the reform did not affect the entitlement period to unemployment insurance benefits. This is the control group which allows us to estimate the time trend µ. The set of variables included in H controls for differences in exit rates between individuals with different employment histories. So the identification of the effect of a change in the entitlement period, modelled by the time until exhaustion in φ hinges on a common trend between individuals with different employment histories.
We do not observe the entire period until work for all spells in our sample, there is right censoring for those spells. Because we observe the reduction of the entitlement period for the spells in the second half of the observed time period censoring occurs more often for the spells with a shorter entitlement period. To account for this we censor every spell after a period of three years. Table 4 shows the results for two different specifications of the time until exhaustion of UI benefits. In the first specification we do not distinguish between periods after exhaustion of UI benefits, while in the second specification we split this period up in four different periods (first month after exhaustion, 1-3 months after exhaustion, 3-6 months after exhaustion and exhaustion after more than 6 months). We have estimated the models with and without covariates X (the estimated coefficients of the covariates, time effects and maximum entitlement period can be found in the appendix).
Generally, we observe that exit rate to work increases when the time time until exhaustion of UI benefits is shortened. The exit rate seems to increase as exhaustion approaches, stays high or increases even more in the first month after exhaustion and then drops again.
5 In the last three months of entitlement to UI benefits the exit rate seems to double compared to the months before. This is in line with our job search model which assumes individuals decrease their reservation wage and lower search intensity as exhaustion of UI benefits approaches so the exit rate increases. The other coefficients are as expected (see Table 16 in the appendix). Since we observe that the exit rate to work depends on the characteristics of the individual, it could also be possible that the effect of the time until exhaustion is different for different subgroups. We have estimated the Cox PH model for various subgroups to investigate this possibility. The results of these estimations are given in Table 5 .
6 The pattern of the exit rate over time until exhaustion is similar for most subgroups. The exit rate peaks around the time of exhaustion and then postponed effect of a drop in reservation wage or increased search efforts. 6 In the table we only show the estimated coefficients of the variables that reflect the time until exhaustion, the other coefficients and their standard errors are available from the authors upon request.
declines. The differences in coefficients of the different time periods are larger for men, indicating that moral hazard is larger for men than for women. The literature on the differences between women and men are mixed: Lalive (2007) finds that the effects of a reduction of the entitlement period are larger for women than for men, while Roed and Zhang (2003) also find that the effects are larger for men. The spike in the exit rate around time of exhaustion seems to increase with the (theoretical) entitlement period to UI benefits. The exit rate after exhaustion of UI benefits declines more rapidly for individuals who would have had an entitlement period of 36 months before the reform than for individuals who would have had an entitlement period of 12 or 24 months. We also observe this higher spike when we compare older unemployed workers with younger unemployed workers. In the theoretical model described in section 2 we assume that the exit rate to work will be higher for individuals with a large drop in income after exhaustion of UI benefits. We have estimated the model for individuals without and with a partner with a wage above the social assistance threshold, who therefore are or are not eligible for social assistance benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits, and distinguish between individuals with UI benefits around the level of social assistance benefits or higher benefits, in other words individuals who do and do not face a large income drop. Table 6 presents the results of these estimations. We observe a higher spike in the exit rate to work for individuals without a partner with a wage higher than the social assistance threshold. These individuals could be eligible for social assistance benefits and therefore face a smaller drop in income than individuals with a partner who earns more than the SA-threshold. Our results are in contrast with the results of Pellizzari (2006) , who does find that people who are likely to collect social assistance benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits do not have a higher probability of finding a job in the last months of unemployment. His study is based on cross-country and self-reported data, which makes his results less reliable than our results. Even more interesting are the estimates for the individuals with UI benefits around the level of social assistance benefits who are eligible for social assistance. This is a group with no or a small drop in income after exhaustion of UI benefits. Even though the income will be similar after UI, we still observe a large spike in exit rate to work in the last months of UI benefits. This indicates that the transition from one regime into another one increases the exit rate.
The effects on job quality
In the previous section we estimated the effects of the length of the entitlement period to UI benefits on the actual length of unemployment duration. The model in section 2 predicts that unemployed workers will lower their reservation wage and number of working hours as the time until exhaustion of UI benefits decreases. This implies that a reduction of the entitlement period would lead to a decrease in job quality. In this section we test this hypothesis by estimating effects on earnings, number of working hours and number of jobs.
Modelling the effects on earnings
In job search theory (section 2) it is generally assumed that the reservation wage is decreasing with elapsed time of UI. In this section we test this hypothesis. We first explore the data by showing the average accepted wage by moment of the first job (measured in months) in figure 5 . Since the reservation wage is decreasing with elapsed time of UI and the moment of finding a job does not depend on other characteristics, we would expect a decrease in the average accepted wage with the moment of the first job. We indeed observe a decrease in the average accepted wage in the figure, although the decrease seems to continue after exhaustion of UI benefits, this is not what the model predicts. This could be due to unobserved characteristics, for example if individuals with a long employment history (and a higher average wage) find jobs faster than individuals without a long employment history. Furthermore, for individuals who are entitled to SA benefits which are comparable to their UI benefits, we would expect that the average accepted wage would remain constant over time. This is not confirmed by figure 5, we do observe a decrease in average accepted wage. However this decrease is smaller than for the total group of individuals entitled to 24 months of UI benefits and could again be due to other characteristics 7 .
Since the reform led to shorter entitlement periods for 99% of the unemployed workers we expect lower wages and smaller number of working hours after the reform. To test this assumption with empirical analysis we study the effect of the reform on the wage, working hours per week, percentage of temporary jobs after unemployment and number of jobs by estimating a difference in difference model for these outcome variables. We use a linear regression model for the estimations, in the form of 7 We have performed estimations where we regressed the observed characteristics and the duration of nonemployment in months on the log of accepted wage. For individuals with an entitlement period of 12 we do find a significant negative effect of the duration of nonemployment on the accepted wage, for individuals with an entitlement period of 24 months the effect is negative but not significant. For individuals with entitlement to comparable SA benefits we find a positive non-significant effect.
where τ is a fixed period after individual i enters unemployment at calendar time t and W are the earnings equal to the log of the accepted wage 8 . If the individual has not accepted a wage in the period τ , the earnings are equal to the UI benefits or social assistance benefits if τ is larger than the entitlement period. We distinguish between three different values of τ ; two years, three years and the first job (within three years) after unemployment. W b i are the earnings before the unemployment spell, H is again the employment history, X are the additional covariates and µ is the time trend to control for seasonal effects. The variable D describes the change (in months) in maximum entitlement period due to the reform. So for calendar time t prior to October 2006, the variable D always equals 0. And for calendar time t after the reform, the variable D describes the difference between the actual length of the entitlement period and how long this period would be for individual i if the unemployment spell would have started prior to the reform. We construct D such that if the reduction in entitlement period due to the reform was six months, D takes value six. This implies that the interpretation of the coefficient δ t is the increase in exit probability due to reducing the entitlement period with one month. We perform separate regressions for different values of τ . The coefficients of the variable which presents the cut of the UI entitlement period in months are reported in table 7 for different subgroups 9 . In these regressions we included the entire sample, if an individual has not found a job within period τ we replace income with received benefits or 0 if the individual is not entitled to UI or social assistance. In table 8 we present the results for the selection of individuals who actually have found work in time interval τ . The estimation results are in line with job search theory and indicate negative effects of a reduction of the entitlement period to UI benefits on the average accepted wage for the total population for both the total group of unemployed workers (table 7) and the workers who actually found a job (table 8) 10 . A reduction of the entitlement period of 12 months would for example lead to a decrease of the accepted first wage of 5,4%. The effects of the reduction of the entitlement period differ per subgroup. We would expect the effects to be larger for individuals with a partner with wage, since 8 The equations for working hours per week, percentage of temporary jobs and number of jobs are defined in a similar way 9 In the regressions we included the observed characteristics and time dummies, the estimation output is available from the authors upon request. 10 Note that the results in table 7 do not only reflect an effect on income but also reflect the drop in benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits the income drop after the UI entitlement period will be larger for this subgroup. We indeed find significant negative effects but those effects are comparable to the effects for the total population. We find the largest negative effects for individuals who used to be entitled to 12 or 18 months before the reform and immigrants. We find positive effects for workers with an entitlement of 6 or 9 months and individuals with a low income before UI 11 . A possible explanation for this is that these individuals find jobs sooner after entering unemployment which increases their experience and value on the job market such that they were able to find better jobs after employment. Centeno and Novo (2009) also find that the positive effect of an increase of UI entitlement on job match is larger for more constrained individuals, those at the bottom of the income distribution. Our model predicts that there would be no effect on accepted wage for people who do not face an income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits. However we do find a significant negative effect of a reduction of the entitlement period on the first wage. This would imply that even without an income drop unemployed workers lower their reservation wage as the end of UI approaches. We find negative effects of the reduction of the maximum entitlement period on earnings, for both the earnings after two and three years. Most earlier research found at most a small negative effect on earnings, Centeno and Novo (2009) 
Effects on number of working hours
In a similar way as the estimations for earnings we have estimated the effects of the reduction of the UI entitlement period on (the log of) the number of working hours of the first job and after two and three years. The results of these estimations are presented in 9. Based on the theory we would expect a negative effect of a reduction of the entitlement period on the number of working hours, since workers will drop their job demands when facing an income drop after exhaustion. For the total population we indeed find negative significant effects, a reduction of the average UI entitlement period of 12 months would for example mean that the average number of working hours for the first job decreases with 1.8%
12 . The effects seem to become smaller with time, we observe smaller coefficients for the job after three years than after two years. For individuals who will receive social assistance benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits which are comparable in height, we do not find any significant effects,
11 Since employment history is partly based on age and income increases with age these groups for a large part overlap. 31% of the individuals with an entitlement period of 6 months has a low income.
12 Before the reform the average number of working hours of the first job was 29.4 hours per week, so this would indicate a decrease of 0,5 hours per week or 28 hours a year which is in line with theory. We find larger effects for individuals who used to be entitled to 12-18 months of UI benefits before the reform and individuals who have a partner with wage. 
Effects on temporary jobs
The reduction of the UI entitlement period has decreased the average earnings and number of working hours of the jobs after unemployment. This indicates that the unemployed accept jobs with lower quality because they receive UI benefits for a shorter period. It could be that unemployed workers accept more temporary jobs because of the reduction. We define both temporary jobs as on-call jobs as temporary jobs. We have estimated the effect of a reduction of the UI entitlement period on the probability of finding a temporary job and having a temporary job after 2 and 3 years after entering unemployment in a similar way as the effect on earnings and number of working hours. Table 10 shows the results of the estimations for the probability of finding a temporary job. We find a positive effect of the reduction of the UI entitlement period on the probability of finding a temporary job as a first job. A reduction of 1 month increasing the probability of accepting a temporary job as a first job with 0,2%, and increases the probability of having a temporary job after two or three years (irrespective of the first job) with 0,2% respectively 0,1%. We do not observe significant effects for individuals with an original entitlement period of 6 or 9 months. The effects for individuals with an entitlement period of 24 months or longer are comparable with the effects for the entire population, the effects for individuals with an entitlement period of 12 or 18 months are twice as large as the effects for the total population. We do not observe significant effects for individuals who had a low income before entering UI. Even though individuals who are entitled to social assistance benefits equal to UI benefits do not face an income drop we still observe a positive effects of the reduction of the UI entitlement period for their first job and after two years.
To our knowledge the study of Boone and van Ours (2012) that analyses the relationship between UI duration and exit to temporary work. They find that the spikes around exhaustion of UI benefits are larger for permanent jobs than temporary jobs and regard this as evidence that spikes occur because unemployed workers delay their starting date of a new job until the moment of exhaustion of UI benefits. This does not have to contrast our results since it could mean that the exit rate to temporary work is increased by a reduction of the UI entitlement period but does not lead to a large spike around the moment of exhaustion, for example because the exit rate to temporary work does not decline after exhaustion.
Effects on number of jobs
The results presented in the previous paragraphs indicate that a reduction of the UI entitlement period has a negative effect on job quality in the form of lower earnings and less working hours. As a result of this lower job quality it is possible that the unemployed workers keep on looking for better jobs while employed and change jobs more often. We also find that they accept more temporary jobs, which could lead them to change jobs more often. In table 11 we present the results of estimations of the effect of the reduction of the UI entitlement period on the number of jobs after unemployment. We distinguish three different time intervals, after 1, 2 and 3 years of entering unemployment. Note that the causality of our findings is not clear, a higher number of jobs could mean that individuals change jobs more often but also that they find jobs earlier and therefore also change more often. Our hypothesis is confirmed by the results of the estimations, we find positive significant effects of the months of benefits before the reform. We do not find significant effects in the first year for the individuals who used to be entitled to 6 or 9 months before the reform, individuals who after exhaustion of UI are entitled to social assistance benefits of a level equal to UI benefits and individuals with a low income. We find that a reduction of the entitlement period increases the number of jobs after unemployment. Earlier literature is less extensive than the literature on unemployment duration and post-unemployment earnings and focusses mostly on the employment time of the first job after unemployment. Addison and Blackburn (2000) and Barbanchon (2012) do not find an effect on the employment duration of the first job after unemployment. Belzil (2000) , Cockx and Picchio (2009) and Tatsiramos (2009) do find a positive effect of an increase of the entitlement period on the duration of the first job. Caliendo et al. (2009) finds that individuals quit their first job after unemployment more frequently when the entitlement period is shortened.
Estimated effects of some changes in the entitlement period
To illustrate our findings we have simulated the estimated effects of a reduction of the entitlement period by 3, 6, 12 or 24 months for individuals with an original entitlement period of 6, 24, 36 or 60 months 15 . The results of these simulations are given in table 12. Note that the reform took place in a time of economic growth. Schmieder et al. (2012a) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011) both find that the moral hazard effect of UI extensions is larger in economic booms, which could mean that we underestimate the effects of the reform. Let us first explore the results for individuals who were entitled to 6 months of benefits before the reform. A reduction of the entitlement period of three months would increase the probability that an individual finds a job within 1 year with 13 Note that the estimations are conditional on finding a job within the selected period so the results do not imply that the reduction of the UI entitlement period has a positive effect on the probability of finding a job. The results of these estimations are presented in the appendix.
14 The average number of jobs after three years is 3, so this would indicate an increases of 0.07 jobs per unemployed worker who found a job within three years. 15 We estimate the effects on the actual inflow into UI of the nine months previous to the reform, January 2006-September 2006. We use the estimated coefficients of the estimations on the relevant subsamples by entitlement period (6-9 months, 12-18 months or 24 months ore more). 10.3%. The probability of finding a job within 2 years increases with 6.0%, within 3 years with 4.7%. The reduction would not lead to a change in the earnings of the first job, the number of working hours or the number of jobs since we did not find significant effects for these outcome variables. The reduction would increase the average earnings after two years with 5.4% and after three years with 5.9%. The effects of a reduction of the entitlement period on the probability of finding a job within 1, 2 or 3 years is smaller as the original entitlement period increases. A reduction of the entitlement period of 3 months increases the probability of finding a job within 1 year with 0.6% for individuals who used to be entitled to 24 months of UI benefits, 0.4% for individuals with an original entitlement period of 36 months and has no effect on the probability of individuals with an original entitlement period of 60 months 16 . The effects are largest in the first year of unemployment, for example a reduction of the entitlement period from 36 to 12 months increases the probability of finding a job within one year with 8.2% and with 7.3% within two years. We find negative effects on the probability of finding a job within 2 and 3 years for individuals with an original entitlement period of 60 months. A reduction of the entitlement period decreases earnings and number of working hours and increases the number of jobs. The longer the original entitlement period, the smaller the relative effects of the reduction. For example a reduction of the entitlement period of 12 months decreases the first earned wage with 7.2% for individuals who used to be entitled to 24 months of UI benefits, 4.8% for individuals who used to be entitled to 36 months and 2.4% for individuals who used to be entitled to 60 months. The effects on earnings are larger than the effects on working hours.
What explains our findings?
Our main results are that actual unemployment duration, the average accepted wage and the number of working hours increase with the length of the entitlement period of UI benefits. After unemployment workers change jobs less frequently when the entitlement period is longer. Similar effects, though smaller, are found for unemployed workers who are entitled to social assistance benefits with a similar level to UI benefits after exhaustion of their UI benefits. The latter result is not what we would expect based on earlier literature and the theoretical framework, since these unemployed workers do not face an income drop after exhaustion of the UI benefits. What could explain these results?
16 Note that the latter result is due to the choice of the reference variable of the variables that present time until exhaustion, since the reference category is more than 24 months until exhaustion and the first year of unemployment always falls in this category for individuals with an original entitlement period of 60 months which is reduced by 24 months or less. 2.0 (0%) (+0.6%) (+1.1%) (+2.2%) (+0.6%) (+1.1%) (+2.2%) (+4.4%) It could be that there exists an uncertainty effect: the unemployed worker has to apply for social assistance benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits and is not sure if and when he will receive these benefits 17 . There is also uncertainty about the conditions of collecting social assistance benefits, since the social assistance law is carried out by local municipalities which have, to a certain degree, freedom in the way they execute this law. For example during UI the unemployed worker has the obligation to apply for a job at least once a month and has to accept jobs that are suitable to him 18 . An unemployed worker collecting social assistance benefits has to accept all possible jobs, but this condition is carried out by municipalities in very different ways. Another explanation is that the unemployed workers react to the existence of the deadline of UI benefits, even though this deadline does not affect their earnings. The existence of welfare stigma is another possible explanation for our finding. Moffitt (1983) finds that the existence of welfare stigma causes individuals not to apply for welfare, even though they are entitled to welfare benefits. This effects occurs by being on welfare and does not vary with the level of the welfare benefits. Welfare stigma is regarded as a fixed cost that decreases the utility of individuals on welfare.
To our knowledge the only other study that estimates the effects of receiving social assistance benefits is that of Pellizzari (2006) . He finds that individuals who also receive social assistance benefits during the period of receiving UI benefits are less sensitive to changes in the UI replacement rate and UI entitlement period. He does not find a spike in the exit rate of the last month of UI benefits for recipients of social assistance benefits or individuals who are likely to become eligible for social assistance benefits after UI. The results of Pellizzari contrast our results. It could be due to the estimation method, Pellizzari uses self-reported data of samples of individuals from European countries, while we use administrative resources on all individuals entering UI in the Netherlands between 2004 en 2008. To check whether the alternative specification of Pellizzari could lead to different results we have performed analysis similar to those of Pellizzari on our data. In these analysis we include interaction terms of the time until exhaustion for individuals who are entitled to social assistance benefits after exhaustion of UI benefits. Since we are able to distinguish between individuals who do or do not face a large income drop, 17 For the application of disability insurance benefits Halpern and Hausman (1986) find that the number of applications depends on the uncertainty concerning the acceptance of a disability claim. The more uncertainty of acceptance, the lower the number of applications.
18 Whether or not a job is regarded as suitable depends on the time that the unemployed worker has received UI benefits. In the first half year only jobs with a similar wage and level are regarded as suitable. Between 6 months and 1 year, jobs that require an educational level of one degree less than the own level are regarded as suitable. After one year all jobs are regarded as suitable jobs.
we also include interactions for individuals with UI benefits equal to social assistance benefits. To check whether potential significant interaction terms for individuals who do not face an income drop are due to their low income or to entitlement to welfare we also include interaction terms for all individuals with UI benefits comparable to social assistance benefits. The results of these estimations are presented in table 14. As in our earlier estimations we find an increase in the job finding rate as time until exhaustion of UI benefits approaches. After exhaustion of UI benefits the job finding rate declines. The estimation results confirm our earlier conclusions that entitlement to social assistance benefits does not decline the spike in the job finding rate around the time of exhaustion. For individuals with an UI entitlement of 12-18 months before the reform the job finding rate increases more after exhaustion of UI benefits. We do find a negative effect on the job finding rate of being entitled to social assistance benefits, but this effect is not related to time until exhaustion. For individuals who do not face a large income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits because their UI benefits are equal to their future social assistance benefits, we also do not find significant interaction terms. Only for individuals with an entitlement period of 24 months or more before the reform we find a significant negative effect in the last month before exhaustion, but this effect is smaller than the general spike in the last month. Unemployed workers with low UI benefits have a lower job finding rate unrelated until time until exhaustion, however these negative effects are compensated by positive interaction terms for specific time periods. The job finding rate appears to be lower before exhaustion of UI benefits, but higher after exhaustion. Remember that these effects apply to all unemployed workers with low UI benefits, not only those who are entitled to social assistance benefits. One possible explanation for this finding is that the assets of unemployed workers are lower so the workers are more in need of an income to provide for themselves.
Based on our analysis the theoretical framework provided in section 2 should be complemented with a fixed cost for applying for social assistance. These costs reflect both uncertainty about approval of the application and the stigma associated with welfare. This means that the social assistance benefits b SA are lowered with c SA , where c SA are equal to the increasing costs from uncertainty before approval of the welfare claim and the fixed costs coming from welfare stigma after approval of the claim. 
Conclusion
The length of the entitlement period of UI benefits is a much debated subject. On the one hand, UI benefits act as a search subsidy, individuals can financially survive without work and are not forced to immediately start working in the first available job, which might be ill-suited for them. On the other hand, UI benefits can cause moral hazard problems where unemployed workers may exert too little effort to find work or become too selective. In this paper we have exploited the change in the Dutch UI system in 2006 to study the effect of the entitlement period to UI benefits on the exit rate to work and post-unemployment job quality. Due to the reform the average maximum entitlement period was reduced, while there were also unemployed workers for who the entitlement period did not change or was even increased. We find results that are in line with earlier literature: a reduction of the entitlement period leads to a higher probability of finding work and decreases the average time until work. This decrease of the actual unemployment time comes at the cost of subsequent job quality as the accepted wage and number of working hours are reduced by the reform, workers accept more temporary jobs and once employed workers change jobs more often. We have also estimated the effects of the entitlement period of UI benefits for individuals who do not face an income drop after exhaustion of their benefits. In contrast to job search theory, we find that even for those individuals a reduction of the entitlement period leads to a decrease of the time until work and lower accepted wages. This implies that not only the level of the benefits of unemployed workers matters, but also other factors.
There are several possible reasons why individuals who do not face an income drop after exhaustion of UI benefits find work faster when their entitlement period is reduced. One possible reason is the existence of stigma in welfare, so receiving welfare benefits comes with an extra cost. Another reason is that during UI an unemployed worker is still uncertain whether she will be entitled to welfare benefits, since the conditions are complex. In addition, the unemployed worker could be committed to accept any potential job when receiving welfare benefits. The final reason is that unemployed workers experience a deadline because they will go from one schema into another scheme and could therefore be motivated to find a work before the deadline. Our result implies that a reduction of the entitlement period is a more effective method to decrease the national UI expenditures than to lower the height of the UI benefits.
time there could also exist a deadline effect: because the unemployed workers face a drop in income after two months this could increase the job search effort.
To check if the increase in the level of the UI benefits has resulted in a lower or higher probability of finding a job after the reform we use a regression discontinuity design where we exploit the fact that for some individuals the length of the entitlement period was not changed by the reform. For these individuals the reform only changed the level of the benefits in the first two months, not the duration of the benefits. This identifies the possible effects of the increase in benefits of the first two months on the probability of finding a job. Our model has the form:
The outcome variable W takes value one if individual i who entered unemployment at calendar time t found work with τ units of time, for τ is 2,3,6,12 and 18 months. The variable D describes whether or not the individual entered after the reform and for that reason was entitled to 75% of his last earned wage instead of 70% for the first two months. This variable therefore identifies the effect of the increase in the benefits of the first two months. Y measures the year of inflow and M the month of inflow, this captures potential seasonal effects. X are the observed characteristics of the unemployed workers. We estimate the model for unemployed workers with an entitlement period of 9 months since this is the smallest possible entitlement period which is unchanged after the reform and we expect the largest results for the smallest periods. Table 15 shows the estimated coefficients for the variable that measures whether or not an individual entered unemployment after the reform and therefore was eligible to 75% of his last earned wage instead of 70% in the first two months. We find negative but insignificant effects, only the effect of entering unemployment after the reform on the probability of finding a job within 3 months is significant at a 10 % significance level. This indicates that the increase of the benefits after the reform had a negligible effect on job search effort. 
